With its protectionist tariff policy, the new U.S. government is ushering in the end of the age of neoliberal globalization.
Tomasz Konicz, 06.04.2025, Originally published in jungle world on 02/27/2025
Protectionism is likely to become the new normal. The first foreign policy reflex of the new U.S. administration was to instigate trade wars. At the beginning of February, just a few days after taking office, President Donald Trump imposed punitive tariffs on goods from China, Canada and Mexico.
Link: https://exitinenglish.com/2025/03/28/into-the-crisis-one-tariff-at-a-time/
At 25%, the import duties on goods from Mexico and Canada were much higher than for China, whose goods were subject to additional import duties of just 10%. The U.S. is by far the most important trading partner for all three countries, with each of them recording trade surpluses.
However, while the tariffs against China actually came into force, Trump suspended the implementation of protectionist measures against neighboring countries to the north and south of the U.S. for 30 days on February 3rd. At this point, the U.S. government entered into negotiations with Mexico and Canada, during which the threat of punitive tariffs remains in place. In fact, Trump has already been able to secure significant concessions: both Canada and Mexico agreed to tighten controls on their borders with the U.S. Mexico wants to mobilize around 10,000 troops to secure the border so as not to jeopardize the economic position of its northern border region as an extension of the U.S. workbench.
In fact, Trump’s alleged economic protectionism is a geopolitical instrument of power that can be used to extort concessions. In the case of Mexico, which is particularly susceptible to economic pressure from the U.S. because of its increased economic dependency on them as a result of the U.S. nearshoring strategy, the aim is for better defense against migration movements. Canada, on the other hand, is apparently actually being forced to integrate more closely into the U.S. economy – the foreseeable struggle for the resources in and trade routes through the rapidly thawing Arctic make Trump’s bizarre annexation demands regarding Canada and Greenland at least understandable.
China immediately announced retaliatory measures: Tariff increases now introduced there include 15% on energy sources and 10% on agricultural machinery, spare parts for trucks and similar products from the U.S. However, the Chinese government has the short end of the stick in such trade wars. In 2024, the U.S. trade deficit amounted to the gigantic sum of $918.4 billion, of which China alone accounted for $295.4 billion. Even if both sides initially suffer economic disadvantages in a trade war, especially in the current stagflative crisis phase, for example in the form of higher inflation, an escalation would always hit the economy with the export surpluses harder than the deficit country, which can at least hope to substitute imports burdened by tariffs through increased domestic production.
The European Union is in a similar situation, having aligned itself with the export-focused German economic model since the euro crisis and achieving a trade surplus of 235.5 billion euros with the U.S. in 2024. Around 20 percent of all EU exports go to the U.S., its most important sales market. The special tariffs of 25 percent on steel and aluminum, which Trump issued in mid-February, were immediately described by the EU as illegal. It saw “no justification for imposing tariffs on its exports,” according to the EU Commission, which threatened countermeasures to “protect the interests of European companies, workers and consumers from unjustified measures.”
Only Trump’s First Salvo in the Transatlantic Trade War
This was effectively only Trump’s first salvo in the coming transatlantic trade war, as only a few manufacturers in the EU are substantially affected by this. The EU’s trade surplus is primarily generated with cars made in Germany, machinery and pharmaceutical products – on February 18th, Trump consequently threatened punitive tariffs of 25% on cars, semiconductors and pharmaceutical products. Added to this is the EU’s agricultural sector, which is incurring the wrath of the U.S. government due to some EU trade restrictions – for example against the infamous chlorinated chicken. The EU agricultural sector knows exactly what to expect. At the turn of the year, agricultural exports from the EU to the U.S. climbed to their highest level in 15 years. “Mountains of butter, pyramids of cheese and lakes of milk” are currently being laid out for export in anticipation of the coming trade barriers, reported the Austrian newspaper Der Standard.
Trump has already indicated to media representatives that his government is working on a comprehensive protectionist offensive that is likely to hit the EU particularly hard. In principle, the upcoming U.S. tariffs are to be imposed on individual EU countries and not on the entire economic area in order to promote divisive tendencies in the EU, make a joint EU counter-strategy more difficult and reward countries governed by Trump’s ideological allies, such as Hungary, with exemptions. The U.S. Department of Commerce is currently drawing up a list of countries that use “unfair trade practices” in order to impose “reciprocal tariffs” on them.
It is almost certain that Germany’s beleaguered car manufacturers will face new burdens, as the EU car import tariffs of 10% are far higher than those in the U.S. (2.5%). The spreading panic was already evident in the public announcement by VW CEO Oliver Blume that he intends to hold direct talks with the U.S. government. The German mechanical engineering industry is also likely to face tariff increases. If the trade conflict with the U.S. escalates, forecasts predict an additional economic slump of up to 1.5% of gross domestic product for Germany in particular.
What Retaliatory Measures Remain for the EU?
Bourbon, jeans, Harley-Davidsons, peanuts – what retaliatory measures are left for the EU? Brussels and Berlin are certainly aware that the EU is at a disadvantage in trade disputes due to its export surplus. So far, leaders have signaled a compromise proposal and a counter-threat to the U.S. government. The EU appears to be prepared to buy larger quantities of liquid gas from the U.S. and to reduce tariffs on U.S. vehicles in order to reduce the U.S. deficit.
Building on the protectionist experience gained during Trump’s first presidency, the EU had already issued a regulation at the end of 2023 that allows for swift retaliatory measures should “economic coercion” be used against the currency area. This time, it is not just about the import of goods, but also services. This could cause difficulties for U.S. IT giants such as Alphabet, Meta and Amazon in particular, who have very quickly come to terms with Trump’s authoritarian efforts.
However, in terms of economic policy, one can hardly speak of an about-face turn in U.S. policy. It is more a further intensification of the previous restrictive trade tendencies, as Joe Biden’s administration also continued the protectionist measures from Trump’s first term in office in a modified form – especially in the form of the economic stimulus programs that benefited domestic producers. And it is precisely in the increasing protectionism that the crisis process becomes evident. The fight for trade surpluses is a concrete expression of the inner barrier of capital choking on its productivity, which has so far been overcome within the framework of neoliberal deficit economies, especially in the U.S.
Trump now appears to be ushering in the final break with the era of neoliberal globalization, which gave rise to gigantic deficit cycles fueled by speculative bubbles. The U.S., with the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, forms the center of this financial bubble economy, in which U.S. trade deficits act as a global economic stimulus program – until the accompanying deindustrialization led to widespread social disruption and political instability in the U.S., which in turn elevated right-wing populist forces to the White House. In their second attempt, they now seem more determined than ever not only to drive forward fascization in domestic policy, but also to stage a revival of the devastating protectionism of the 1930s, which exacerbated the crisis at the time.
Originally published in jungle world on 02/27/2025