The pillars of the global financial system, the bond markets of the core states of the late capitalist world system, are beginning to wobble.
22.02.2026
„Japan, Japan / Samurai / und schon kommt / der Tod herbei.“
Abwärts1
It was a historic victory for Japan’s unofficial ruling party, the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), which Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi was able to secure in the snap elections on February 8th.2 The LDP, whose members will now occupy 316 of 465 parliamentary seats, holds a two-thirds majority in parliament for the first time in Japan’s postwar history. Mrs. Takaichi owes this overwhelming electoral triumph primarily to her popular campaign promises, which, in Japanese tradition, include debt-financed social and stimulus programs. Despite the exorbitant level of national debt, Takaichi intends in particular to suspend the value-added tax on food in order to ease inflationary pressure on wage earners. However, this would once again put the right-wing head of government on a collision course with the financial markets, which had already reacted in mid-January with a full-blown market quake to this populist proposal.
These were extreme market movements that also reached historic proportions. In mid-January, Japan’s 40-year bond reached an interest rate of more than four percent, representing an extreme, previously unrecorded slump in the ultra-long-term government security introduced in 2007, as the Financial Times explained.3 In the case of government bonds, interest rate develops inversely to market value: when prices rise, interest falls; when prices fall, the yield on the paper increases. The longer the maturity of a bond, the higher the return.
And this is crucial: for many years, the bond markets of the core states (USA, Japan, FRG, Great Britain, etc.) formed the dullest, most boring segment of the global financial sphere, where effectively nothing relevant happened. Even during the major financial crises of the 21st century, such as the dot-com bubble or the real estate speculation boom, bond markets remained relatively stable until 2020. And this foundation, this concrete of the financial sphere, which had already begun to show initial cracks after the pandemic-induced inflation surge starting in 2020,4 is now beginning to wobble; it seems to be liquefying, turning into quicksand. The bond markets of the centers of the world system, which in every previous crisis functioned as “safe havens” and consequently exhibited particularly low or even negative interest rates (mostly the USA, but also Germany during the euro crisis), suddenly resemble the markets of the semi-periphery, known for drastic price swings.
How dramatic the situation on the Japanese bond market became in mid-January is also illustrated by the price jump of the 30-year bond, whose yield increased by a quarter of a percentage point within a single trading day.5 This, too, is a record-setting surge in interest rates, as daily changes in government bond yields are usually measured in basis points, with 100 basis points corresponding to one percentage point. A look back at the year 2021, when the same bond yielded just under one percent, clearly shows how fundamentally the situation on the Japanese bond market has changed.
Japan’s bond market, with its formerly very low interest rate level, had long been considered a “cheap source of financing and a haven of stability in times of global turmoil,” noted the news agency Bloomberg.6 Interest rate jumps of a quarter of a percentage point, such as those recorded within a single trading day in January, used to take place at a slow-motion pace just a few years ago, over “weeks, if not months,” according to Bloomberg.
Keynesian Nightmares
The apparent stability in the first two decades of the 21st century was a byproduct of Japan’s prolonged deflationary period, into which the export nation fell after the bursting of the great Japanese real estate bubble at the beginning of the 1990s. These “lost decades” were characterized, alongside slightly declining prices, by a persistent, long-lasting economic stagnation. Regardless of their specific political orientation, nearly all governments during this roughly 30-year deflationary period attempted to stimulate economic growth with ever larger stimulus programs, all of which ultimately proved to be short-lived economic flashes in the pan. (For more details, see: “Dare More Alcoholism.”)7
At times, these stimulus programs- whose absurd dimensions could have sprung from the wet dreams of dogmatic Keynesians – took on tragicomic traits, such as when the government launched a subsidy program for alcohol consumption among young Japanese in order, in classic demand-oriented policy fashion, to reverse the industry’s falling revenues along with declining tax income. And it is precisely these classic Keynesian stimulus packages to which Japan now owes, by a wide margin, the highest national debt of all industrialized countries. The Japanese state’s debt amounts to more than 230 percent of economic output- Italy’s stands at “only” 136 percent. At the same time, apart from brief economic spurts, the stagnation of the Japanese economy could not be broken.8 Throughout the entire 21st century, Nippon’s economic growth fluctuated between two and 0.3 percent, interrupted by the severe crisis downturns of 2009 and 2020, which were temporarily cushioned by gigantic stimulus programs.
For long periods, this Japanese tower of debt functioned smoothly – precisely because of the general zero-interest-rate policy of central banks in the late phase of globalization: A large portion of Japanese government debt is held by domestic investors (more than 80 percent), which has a stabilizing effect, particularly in times of crisis. Moreover, similar to Germany, Japan maintained a positive trade balance over long periods, which effectively amounts to an export of debt. Due to the low domestic interest rates and economic stagnation, Japanese capital seeking investment increasingly flowed abroad, making Nippon one of the most important investors. Japan, for example, replaced China as the largest buyer of U.S. government bonds. In addition, Japan’s debt towers were erected in the era of globalization and financialization of late capitalism, which was characterized by declining key interest rates and successive speculative bubbles that continuously grew in scale.
However, the apparent stability of Japan within this debt-fuled global bubble economy, which with its deficit cycles formed the foundation of the age of neoliberal globalization, increasingly eroded after its inflationary end. Because of the high level of debt, Japan’s central bank (Bank of Japan – BoJ) refused to follow the monetary policy reversal away from extremely expansionary monetary policy that central banks in the core economies began implementing in 2021. While the Fed and the ECB started raising key interest rates as early as mid-2022 and reduced their bloated balance sheets by cutting back on securities purchases, the BoJ only managed to bring itself to this turnaround in March 2024. The high level of debt and persistent stagnation caused the BoJ to hesitate. Even though Japan’s interest burden is much lower than that of the United States, debt servicing—after social spending—now constitutes the second-largest budget item in Tokyo, accounting for around 25 percent.9
Japanese Tightrope Walk
Tokyo’s departure from the expansionary monetary policy of the neoliberal era was thus initiated with a delay of nearly two years compared to Brussels and Washington. This is reflected in the balance sheets of the central banks, which in the late phase of globalization (especially between 2009 and 2021) purchased securities and government bonds through so-called quantitative easing in order to stabilize the financial sphere. After the onset of the inflationary period, this extreme form of expansionary monetary policy had to be discontinued. Maturing bonds were no longer replaced with new purchases, causing the Fed’s balance sheet to shrink from 8.9 trillion dollars in mid-2022 to 6.5 trillion at present.10 A similar development can be observed at the ECB, which held securities worth 8.7 trillion euros in 2022, reducing this figure to 6.2 trillion by early 2026 (although this trend toward reducing central bank balance sheets already appears to have run its course, as government bond purchases seem to be increasing again on both sides of the Atlantic).11 By contrast, Japan’s BoJ has hardly been able to reduce its balance sheet; it stands only around 11 percent below the historic peak of 2024.12
Moreover, Nippon’s interest rate turnaround is far from complete, as the BoJ’s key interest rate stands at only 0.75 percent, while inflation has stubbornly remained above the two-percent mark for four years now—the target set by the central bank as its monetary objective.13 Although a slowdown in price dynamics can now be observed, inflationary pressure persists, as Japan’s export economy remains heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and energy resources.14 This price surge is now being partly fueled by the reaching of capital’s external ecological limit:15 the escalating climate crisis and increasing supply bottlenecks for essential raw materials and intermediate goods. A return to the stable consumer prices to which Japan’s consumers have grown accustomed over recent decades is therefore hardly possible.
Takaichi once again appears to want to pursue the usual Japanese strategy of “growing out” of debt through stimulus programs and limited inflation, a strategy that already failed in past decades—this time with a focus on right-wing military Keynesianism (armament programs) and mass demand. So far, estimates project economic growth of around one percentage point for 2026, following just 0.9 percent in the previous year.16 Yet – and this is crucial – the room for political maneuver is becoming ever narrower amid rising debt and persistent inflation. Takaichi’s great role model is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose “Abenomics”17 from 2013 onward combined gigantic investment programs equivalent to 224 billion dollars with neoliberal structural reforms. Despite a short-term economic surge, public debt could only be stabilized at a high level (from 196 percent in 2013 to 191 percent of GDP in 2018), before exploding once again during the pandemic.
The decisive difference from Abe’s time in office, however, is the global crisis epoch of stagflation, which replaced the global financial bubble economy during the pandemic-induced crisis surge.18 Inflationary pressure is forcing monetary policy toward a higher interest rate level. In addition, the high dependence on resource and energy imports is weighing on the Japanese currency, the yen, which tends to depreciate. Consequently, the government and the central bank in Tokyo find themselves in a monetary policy confrontation similar to that in Washington. The BoJ – which already holds nearly 50 percent of all Japanese government bonds – declared at the beginning of February that it would intervene in the event of possible turbulence in the bond market, which could be triggered by Takaichi’s credit-financed stimulus policy, only as a last resort. It would step in only in the case of speculation-driven “panic,” and then only “short term,” in order to avoid long-term bond purchase programs, according to the BoJ.19
In response, Tokyo began searching for alternative sources of financing: Japan’s largest pension fund, the sovereign wealth fund GPIF, with assets equivalent to 1.8 trillion dollars, is to change its conservative investment guidelines prematurely in order to purchase more Japanese government bonds.20 Japan’s pensioners are expected to step into the breach left by the BoJ—especially since the bond holdings of Japanese pension funds, amounting to 67.6 trillion yen, are many times smaller than those of the BoJ (522 trillion).
Carry no more?
The economic tightrope walk that Tokyo has to perform due to constantly growing mountains of debt is thus becoming ever more difficult – the tightrope is getting narrower, to stay with the metaphor. The intensifying contradiction between monetary policy and economic policy, between fighting inflation and stimulating the economy, which characterizes late-capitalist crisis management in the current phase of crisis with its stagflationary tendencies,21 is further intensified – and exported – by Japan’s highly interconnected economy via interest rate and currency developments. Japan not only has to import a large share of resources and energy sources, which perpetuates inflation due to the ongoing depreciation of the yen; as an export nation, it is also one of the largest capital exporters, whose capital could now be withdrawn from the global financial sphere.
Specifically: Japan’s excessive debt causes the Japanese currency (yen) to depreciate and it fuels inflation, to which monetary policy responds with interest rate hikes, while yields on Japanese government bonds soar. Interventions by the central bank to stabilize bond prices through purchases lead to a further depreciation of the yen – this is one of the concrete reasons for the monetary restraint of the BoJ. But this increasingly nullifies the interest rate difference between Japan and the rest of the core economies, which was essential for global capital flows over the past decades. The low interest rate level in deflationary Japan ensured in the 21st century that yield-seeking Japanese capital was massively invested abroad.
Bloomberg puts Japanese foreign investments at around five trillion dollars.22 In addition, there are the so-called carry trades, in which foreign investors take out low-interest loans in yen in order to invest this capital in markets with higher interest rates. The scale of these speculative yen bets, which are highly dependent on currency developments, cannot be precisely quantified; it runs into the trillions. Bloomberg estimates the current volume of Japanese carry trades at 1.1 trillion dollars.
A permanently higher interest rate level in Japan, a lasting leveling of the aforementioned interest rate differential between Japan and the Western core economies, would lead to a reversal of Japanese capital flows. If, as mentioned above, the Japanese pension fund GPIF is to hold a higher share of domestic government bonds in the future in order to stabilize the Japanese bond market, this would entail capital outflows or at least reduced investment activity abroad. If this trend were to become entrenched, the stability of the global financial sphere would decline. Japan, which in the 21st century functioned as a stabilizing factor of the financial sphere through capital exports, would henceforth contribute to its destabilization. The capital outflows could quickly put pressure on the bond markets in the Western core states – foremost the USA.
From Chimerica to Nippomerica
The most effective lever with which the BoJ can intervene in the bond market and at least slow the depreciation of the yen consists in selling foreign exchange reserves, for example in the form of US government bonds (Treasuries). And Japan has plenty of those. By now, around 13 percent of all outstanding US bonds are in the hands of Japanese investors – their value amounts to no less than 1.2 trillion dollars. Thus Japan has replaced the People’s Republic of China, which holds Treasuries worth only 682 billion dollars (just a few years ago it was more than a trillion dollars),23 as the largest creditor of the United States. This means that the crisis of Japanese public finances automatically spills over to the United States, which under Trump is running a gigantic budget deficit.
Now one of the most important features of the crisis period of neoliberal globalization comes to light: the great Pacific deficit cycle. The US, with the dollar as the world’s leading currency, built up a gigantic trade deficit that enabled export-oriented countries such as China or Japan to generate enormous trade surpluses. This American deficit-driven economy stabilized the hyper-productive global economy, with export countries reinvesting their surpluses in the US financial sphere, for example in bonds. Corresponding to the flow of goods into the US in these deficit cycles is a financial flow of „finance-securities“ from the US toward the surplus countries. In recent years, a fundamental shift has thus taken place within the Pacific deficit cycle, in which China is rapidly reducing its holdings of American bonds while Japan has expanded them. The Chinese-American deficit cycle, formerly often referred to as Chimerica,24 is now transitioning into an unstable American-Japanese deficit cycle that could be described as Nippomerica.
The stagflationary crisis trap, the aporia of late-capitalist crisis policy, which demands mutually exclusive efforts from the political elites to curb inflation and stimulate the economy, is also reflected in Japanese-American relations. The US under Trump, on the one hand, desires a strong yen, bolstered by a high-interest-rate policy of the BoJ, in order to reduce the trade deficit with Japan. Despite US tariffs of 15 percent on most Japanese imports, Nippon was still able in 2025 to generate a substantial trade surplus of 7.5 trillion yen (48 billion dollars) vis-à-vis the US, which corresponds to a reduction of only 12.6 percent compared to 2024.25 The depreciation of the Japanese currency undermines the tariff regime agreed between Japan and the US in mid-2025: in May, one dollar was worth 145 yen; by the end of the year, 155 yen had to be paid for a greenback.
At the same time, however, a high interest rate level in Japan would destabilize the American bond market and push the US to the brink of a budget crisis, since this would lead to capital outflows and rising interest rates in the United States. According to an analysis by the investment bank Goldman Sachs, the “risk of contagion” is already present, as increases in Japanese bond yields of ten basis points were associated with a corresponding rise in yields of “two to three” basis points in the “US and elsewhere”.26 A strong yen, tending to appreciate against the dollar, would moreover render impossible the outlined carry trade that channels Japanese capital into the US financial sphere. The crisis of capitalism is driving states and economic areas into ever harsher competition due to tendencies toward deindustrialization,27 and at the same time it binds them together through the global accumulation of debt. This is one of those contradictions that the capitalist crisis process produces in excess. Specifically, the turbulence on the Japanese bond market at the end of January was initially smoothed only by the threat of an American-Japanese intervention, apparently coordinated between Washington and Tokyo.28
The bluff worked for the time being, yet the US remains highly vulnerable to crisis. Trump’s – well – “economic policy” consists of a reenactment of his first term, during which gigantic tax giveaways and deregulations for the US oligarchy29 were passed within the framework of the Big Beautiful Bill 2025.30 These tax breaks are intended to stimulate the economy through rising investment activity and increased consumption, similar to the first Trump presidency. The result is an extreme US budget deficit which, according to forecasts, is expected to swell from 5.8 percent of GDP in 2026 to 6.1 percent in the coming decade and to 6.7 percent in 2036 – this, mind you, is the unlikely best-case scenario without taking into account any crisis surges whatsoever.31
The European Nuclear Option
At the same time, the financing conditions for the U.S. government on the American bond market have deteriorated massively.32 During Trump’s first presidency, at the end of the large liquidity bubble between 2017 and early 2021, 10-year T-Bonds yielded on average less than two percent – now it’s more than four percent. This difference from Trump’s first term results from the end of the global financial bubble economy, which was stifled by the inflation period during the pandemic, as well as the decline of U.S. hegemony, which has increasingly eroded the position of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. And it is precisely Donald Trump who has accelerated this monetary erosion of the Greenback through his openly imperialist policies.33 The fiscal situation in Washington can already be described as strained in view of a national debt of more than 120 percent of GDP: debt service now consumes more tax revenue than the bloated U.S. military budget.34
The hegemony of the United States in the era of finance-driven neoliberal globalization was effectively based on deficit-driven crisis delay: the objective debt compulsion of the world system, which cushioned the effects of the IT revolution in the neoliberal age, took place through the afromentioned global deficit cycles – with the U.S. at their center. Washington could borrow cheaply in the world reserve currency, as long as the dollar was accepted by other export-oriented states or economic areas (China, Japan, EU) within the framework of hegemony, since they profited from it through export surpluses. Since Trump wants to put an end to this through protectionism, the global incentive to accept the Greenback as the world’s reserve currency also disappears. Trump’s erratic foreign policy so far – a mix of protectionism and oil imperialism – seems aimed at retaining the monetary advantages of hegemony by strengthening the dollar’s role as an “oil currency” through attacks on resource-rich countries (Venezuela, possibly Iran), while at the same time eliminating the disadvantages of hegemony – above all the deindustrialization35 of the U.S. – through protectionism and resource imperialism.
Yet this imperialist approach already seems to be failing. With this confrontational strategy, the position of the Greenback as the world’s reserve currency becomes precarious despite the imperialist oil wars, as Washington’s rivals see little reason to continue accepting it as a reserve currency given the diminishing incentives. This became concrete during the Greenland conflict between the U.S. and the EU, when Trump was on the verge of militarily occupying the Arctic island.36 The imperialists in Washington were not deterred by the Europeans’ military posturing – which could not win a sustained military confrontation with the U.S. army in the Arctic – but by developments in the U.S. bond market. U.S. bond yields literally exploded on January 20, after several Scandinavian funds announced in response to Trump’s threats that they would liquidate their positions in U.S. bonds.37
“Europe owns Greenland, but it also owns a lot of Treasuries,” a Deutsche Bank analyst told Business Insider at the end of January.38 The high U.S. dependence on foreign capital to finance Washington’s deficits represents a “decisive weakness,” according to Business Insider, which estimated the volume of all American securities held by Europe at around eight trillion dollars – almost twice as much as all other countries and economic areas combined. And this is also the scale of the Atlantic deficit cycle, which allowed the former export world champion Germany, for example, to set new export records against the U.S. for years.39
Europe’s longest lever of power over Trump, therefore, does not consist of military potential, Arctic-ready brigades, or the like, but of the eight trillion dollars’ worth of U.S. bonds lying dormant in digital bank vaults east of the Atlantic. It is an European nuclear option: the insurance of mutual economic destruction in the event of a conflict escalation. Because, of course, a massive sell-off of U.S. securities would backfire on Europe and only execute the core meltdown of the global financial system, which is increasingly looming anyway given the crisis maturity reached.
Bond Crisis and the AI Bubble
The decisive factor, then, is the objective crisis process, which asserts itself through deficit cycles and the now increasing crisis-imperialist conflicts. And it can be stated clearly that by now all safety mechanisms have been exhausted, which historically delayed the systemic piston seizure of the capital machine suffocating under its own contradictions.40 States form the last line of defense of capital against its own contradictions, which drive it toward global and self-destruction. The increasing state intervention, the crisis tendency toward state capitalism, to which even the dull leftist opportunism along with the regressive old left cling, are expressions of the end time of capital. The bond markets of the central states form the cracked concrete, the eroding foundation of the world financial system. That is bedrock, to drift into gamer jargon – after that, there is nothing left, no further fallback position, no safety net to absorb the force of the crisis dynamics in the next wave. There remains only the collapse of capital in one or more centers of the world system.
In fact, the era of the state as a central crisis actor also seems to be drawing to an end in the centers (in the semi-periphery, this has long been the case): The bond markets of all central countries are under pressure, not only in Japan and the US, but also in Europe, such as in France or Italy.41 Even in Germany, the era of interest-free government debt has long passed. The era of finance-market-driven globalization tended to make state financing ever cheaper, as alternating speculation bubbles minimized the inflationary potential of expansive monetary policy and shifted it into the financial sphere („inflation of securities prices“). Since this is no longer possible, even a moderate rise in US bond yields, corresponding roughly to the levels at the beginning of the 21st century, is destabilizing, as the debt of central states is much higher after decades of costly crisis policies (in the case of the US, government debt rose from 60 percent of GDP in 2005 to over 120 percent in 2025).
The new instability of the bond markets practically invites geopolitical instrumentalization. Bonds have now become both a means and an object of confrontation in the intensifying crisis competition. This was not only the case in the American-European dispute over Greenland. China is also trying to destabilize the US bond markets. In early February, Chinese financial regulators publicly urged the institutional investors of the „People’s Republic“ to reduce their positions in Treasuries due to the „volatility“ of the US market.42 The entire foundation of the globalization era, the deficit cycles with the American deficit economy at their center, is effectively disintegrating.
The bond market is therefore already unstable. It only needs an external trigger to topple the entire precarious house of cards. And this trigger is clearly emerging: it is the AI bubble, whose bursting is only a matter of time.43 Two patterns are already becoming apparent, which will again necessitate comprehensive state crisis interventions: On the one hand, there is the usual divergence in bubble formation between eager profit expectations in the new industry and the complex reality, which will be characterized by a few winners and many losers. Many of the new AI startups will simply go bankrupt (OpenAI?), while some established major corporations – such as Google – will capture a large part of the new markets. Moreover, the AI bubble is underpinned by an ecologically ruinous construction boom (data centers), which significantly contributes to the US economy and threatens to turn into billion-dollar investment ruins due to construction delays, energy shortages, exploding costs, and the rapid obsolescence of already acquired graphics cards.
When this AI bubble bursts, Washington would have to pour trillions into stimulus programs to absorb the shock; moreover, the pressure on Trump would increase to rescue many of the technofascists exposed in the AI bubble, who helped him win the election, through billion-dollar bailouts. Oracle is particularly at risk, as it is controlled by the reactionary Trump confidant Larry Ellison, since the company is currently sinking billions into data centers and taking out enormous loans for this purpose.44
In the medium term, however, the advancement of the AI industry weighs far more heavily than the bubble’s troubled formation process. The survivors of the coming AI crash will fundamentally transform the late-capitalist mode of production, similar to the spread of the internet at the beginning of the 21st century.45 What this means became clear in the crashes on the stock exchanges in early February, when new modules of the AI startup Anthropic raised fears of massive disruption in established software sectors. Nearly $300 billion were withdrawn from the affected IT sectors. Entire software licensing models and business areas based on workplace licenses and office work risk becoming simply obsolete.46 The internal barrier of capital, its tendency constantly reinforced by innovation and competition to rid itself of its substance, the value-generating labor, now extends to the IT sector itself, which has largely automated industrial production since the late 1980s. The market value of programmers and sysadmins is also likely to decline soon.
The states in the centers of the late capitalist system, which are already reaching the limits imposed by the markets in the form of rising interest burdens, will therefore inevitably become executors of the devaluation of value in the coming crisis wave. Either through inflation, by massively printing money and purchasing bonds via central banks, or through deflation, if austerity is pursued, which would devalue capital in its states of variable and constant capital.
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4j_7WqTxokw
2 https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/wahlen-japan-102.html
3 https://www.ft.com/content/68349aa9-9b4e-44a2-abd4-f1964308cf29
4 https://www.konicz.info/2022/11/09/mountains-of-debt-on-the-move/
5 https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/japans-scheinbare-stabilitaet-broeckelt-und-die-maerkte-werden-nervoes-ld.1922245
6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-01-25/japan-bond-market-crash-raises-alarm-for-global-interest-rates
7 https://www.konicz.info/2022/12/30/japan-in-der-krise-mehr-alkoholismus-wagen/
8 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=JP
9 https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/japans-scheinbare-stabilitaet-broeckelt-und-die-maerkte-werden-nervoes-ld.1922245
10 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm
11 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECBASSETSW
12 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JPNASSETS
13 https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/interest-rate
14 https://www.jcer.or.jp/english/the-state-of-inflation-in-japan
15 https://www.konicz.info/2022/03/05/klimakrise-und-inflation/
16 https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/23/boj-rate-decision-snap-election-takaichi-gdp.html
17 https://www.cmegroup.com/education/featured-reports/abenomics-a-work-in-progress-after-five-years
18 https://www.konicz.info/2021/11/18/back-to-stagflation/
19 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/boj-wont-come-rescue-takaichi-driven-bond-rout-2026-02-04/
20 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-27/japans-anleihen-krise-nahrt-spekulationen-uber-umschichtung-bei-staatsfonds-gpif
21 https://www.konicz.info/2021/11/18/back-to-stagflation/
22 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-01-25/japan-bond-market-crash-raises-alarm-for-global-interest-rates
23 https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/economy/mohamed-el-erian-sounds-alarm-as-china-s-us-treasury-share-hits-15-year-low-at-7/ar-AA1WrD2j
24 https://www.konicz.info/2010/09/18/zerbricht-chimerica/
25 https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02684/
26 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-01-25/japan-bond-market-crash-raises-alarm-for-global-interest-rates https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-06/goldman-sees-japan-bond-shocks-spilling-over-to-treasuries
27 https://www.konicz.info/2025/11/01/understanding-jd-vance/
28 https://www.ft.com/content/0cff24f9-3c5e-4aff-966a-ff34ef448a2d
29 https://www.americanprogress.org/article/7-ways-the-big-beautiful-bill-cuts-taxes-for-the-rich/
30 https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/07/president-trumps-one-big-beautiful-bill-is-now-the-law/
31 https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/us-budget-deficit-to-keep-growing-amid-trump-tax-cuts-tariffs-cbo-forecasts-show/ar-AA1WaHpi
32 https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/TVC-US10Y/
33 https://www.konicz.info/2025/03/16/everything-must-burn/
34 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-big-beautiful-bill-federal-debt-servicing-cost-what-to-know/
35 https://www.konicz.info/2025/06/07/trump-at-the-inner-barrier-of-capital/
36 https://www.thedefensenews.com/news-details/Pentagon-Places-1500-Arctic-Trained-Airborne-Troops-on-Standby-as-Greenland-Dispute-Escalates/
37 https://x.com/tkonicz/status/2014306995126374710
38 https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-greenland-europe-us-asset-holdings-treasurys-shares-sell-america-2026-1?IR=T
39 https://jungle.world/artikel/2025/14/autoland-ist-abgebrannt
40 https://www.konicz.info/2025/05/26/trump-an-der-inneren-schranke-des-kapitals/
41 https://apnews.com/article/france-politics-economy-debt-taxes-72483f02abece038b1888cf43cb652ee
42 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-urges-banks-curb-us-treasuries-exposure-bloomberg-news-reports-2026-02-09/
43 https://www.konicz.info/2024/08/05/ai-the-final-boost-to-automation/
44 https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/oracle-to-raise-up-to-50bn-in-debt-and-equity-in-2026/
45 https://www.konicz.info/2024/08/05/ai-the-final-boost-to-automation/
46 https://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-2-6-anthropics-claude-cowork-release-triggers-285-billion-saaspocalypse-a-brutal-wake-up-call-for-legacy-tech-and-finance